cumvent" (op. cit., p. 318). Why? The point of explaining the minimalist's position in terms of (T) is, in part, that it captures the idea that truth is not a concept restricted to any particular language.
Propositions are translinguistic. They may be expressed in different languages, and some may not be expressed in any actual human language. This aspect of the concept of truth would not be captured in a tendency to accept (nonsemantically defective) instances of (T").
Davidson concluded that:
We cannot eliminate this iteration of the same sentence without destroying all appearance of a theory. But we cannot understand the result of the iteration unless we can see how to make use of the same semantic features of the repeated sentence in both of its appearances-make use of them in giving the semantics of the schema instances. I do not see how this can be done (op. cit., p. 318).
Here, Davidson means he does not see how it can be done compatibly with the role the phrase is to play in expressing minimalism; for he has provided one way of understanding it which is unproblematic, but not useful for Horwich's purposes.
II
Horwich has replied to this objection by refusing the challenge issued, but, I think, mistakenly.
Davidson's...objection to the brand of deflationism presented here is that expressions like 'the proposition that dogs bark', construed as singular terms, are unintelligible. However, this rather counterintuitive claim is entirely theory-driven: it is derived from his inability to find any account (of the sort required by his truth-theoretic paradigm) of how the referents of such expressions could be determined by the referents of their parts.' Horwich concludes that Davidson's inability to find any appropriate account of expressions of the form 'the proposition that p' is a reason to give up Davidson's truth-theoretic paradigm, rather than a reason to reject minimalism.
Horwich mischaracterizes Davidson's semantic program.4 But, in 3 Truth, p. 133. 4Horwich claims that "no-one yet has been able to articulate a conception of 'truth condition' (that is, of 'u is true if and only if p') that would be sufficiently strong to constitute the facts about meaning (that is, 'u means that p')"-"Davidson on Deflationism," p. 22. This is a misunderstanding. A Tarski-style truth theory is not a meaning theory. Davidson's claim is rather that a Tarski-style truth theory we know and about which we know certain things will put us in a position to understand every sentence of the object language. In particular, we are supposed to know that a Tarski-style theory meets Convention T, or a suitable analog for natural languages, in order to use it for interpretation. Consider just the case of a language L without any case, the challenge is not tied to that program, except insofar as that program is committed to making sense of the referents of complex referring terms (or the denotations of definite descriptions construed as quantifier expressions) on the basis of their semantically significant parts. This is presumably something we should all be committed to, whatever our other commitments. It is also worth noting that Davidson did not claim that descriptions such as 'the proposition that dogs bark' are unintelligible. On this point, Horwich has misread him. He only claimed that he could not see how to give the semantics for such terms in a way that serves Horwich's purposes.
Horwich offers a "use-theoretic" account of' u expresses the proposition that p' in one place, namely, u expresses the proposition that p iff Int(u) = my 'p' "where the content of the right-hand side is that our procedures of interpretation, when applied to the utterance u (given the context in which it occurs) yields the sentence 'p' of the interpreter's current language."5 This does not meet the challenge, for it does not explain or exhibit how we understand 'the proposition that p' on the basis of understanding its constituent expressions. But it is not intended to meet that challenge. It is intended to make sense of our understanding the expression without having to meet the challenge. Does it do so? And does it do so in a way that serves Horwich's purposes? I think it is doubtful that it does suffice to make sense of our understanding of the expression. Even if u is the utterance of an indicative sentence, since sentential mood is no guarantee that a proposition is expressed, the interpretation relation is still inadequate to capture the idea that u expresses a proposition. This may be because the sentence itself, though it has an interpretation, is also defective in a way that prevents it from expressing a proposition. Or it may be because it is a sentence that, as is sometimes alleged about ethical sentences, although in the indicative mood, has some function in the language besides that of expressing propositions. Even waiving these objections, would this account serve Horwich's purposes? It would not, if Davidson was right, as Horwich grants, that the interpretation he offered of the (T)-schema is not adequate for Horwich's purposes. The difficulty with Davidson's suggestion, for Horwich's purposes, was that it tied understanding of truth to a language, because it tied understanding the literal content of 'the proposition that p' to a particular language. Horwich's own proposal does the same thing, for it amounts to saying that our understanding of this phrase is bound up with thinking that a sentence interpreted in a language, one's own, interprets an utterance. But the concept of a proposition, and of truth, was to be translinguistic.
The challenge then needs to be answered. The problem is to give an account of the semantic structure of 'the proposition that p' that does not involve relativization to any language, and otherwise raises no problems for understanding (T) in a way compatible with minimalism. I will adapt certain features of Davidson's proposal for indirect discourse.7 Davidson's well-known proposal is that an utterance of a sentence such as (1) can be treated as equivalent semantically to an utterance of (2).
(1) Galileo said that the earth moves.
(2) Galileo said that. The earth moves.
In (2), 'that' functions in use as a demonstrative referring to the following utterance of 'The earth moves', and 'Galileo said that' as used is true just in case some utterance of Galileo's translates the utterance demonstrated. Here, although a sentence is used to make an utterance, and the meaning of the utterance is determined by the sentence's being used in English, no reference to English is required for the utterance to express the proposition that the sentence expresses as so used in English. 8 We can make use of the fact that this proposal relies upon, that an utterance act (a locutionary act in Austin's sense) is individuated, if it is of a fully meaningful declarative sentence, and not otherwise semantically defective as used (for example, by including a nonreferring demonstrative), by (inter alia) what proposition it expresses.9 For present purposes, we may treat 'the proposition that p' as a complex referring term.'o The idea then is to appeal to uses of 'the proposition that p', and require that they refer to the proposition expressed by 'p' as used in it. The most straightforward adaptation of Davidson's proposal about indirect discourse would be to treat a use of 'the proposition that p' as involving a demonstrative reference to an utterance of 'p'. The whole expression then would be required to refer to the proposition expressed by what 'that' is used to refer to. This would not involve any reference to the sentence 'p' or its language in the account of the semantic structure of 'the proposition that p'. Treating the reference as secured by a demonstration by the speaker, however, is a feature of Davidson's original account which is not necessary, and which causes unnecessary difficulties, which throw the adequacy of the account into doubt on independent grounds." My aim then is to develop the proposal without Davidson's commitment to parataxis.
We wish to treat 'the proposition that p' as having a referent only in use, because it is used to refer to the proposition expressed by the utterance of 'p' embedded in it. The proposal can be expressed precisely as a reference clause in an interpretive truth theory for the language which gives the referent of the expression relative to a use of it."2 We do this by quantifying over utterances of the expression by a speaker at a time, and utterances of its component 'p', requiring the utterance of the whole to refer to the proposition expressed by the utterance of the component. Clearly, (R) gives us a way of understanding how the referent of an utterance of 'the proposition that p' is determined on the basis of the parts of the expression that secures intuitively the right proposition (if any) as its referent, without any relativization of the sentence 'p' to its language being involved in our understanding of how the referent is secured.
It is no objection to this that we quantify over sentences of the language in (R). Quantification over expressions of the language is involved in every clause in a truth theory. We would not say on that ground that all of those expressions for which we give referents, or satisfaction or truth conditions, are about their language, or express concepts that involve the concept of any particular language. The use of the sentence as a sentence of the language determines that it expresses the proposition it does, but we get at the proposition not through referring to the language but through referring to the utterance. So our grasp of (T) does not involve any restriction, on this "4 Similarly we use quantifiers in the metalanguage when giving the recursive truth conditions for quantifiers in the object language, proper names in the metalanguage when giving the referents of proper names in the object language, and quotation names in the metalanguage when giving the referents of quotation names in the object language. This is permissible when our object is to show how understanding of parts and their combination is involved in understanding the complexes in which they appear. the problem Davidson raised was bound up with commitment to truththeoretic semantics; but it was also a mistake to think that it could not be solved within that framework without reference to a particular language. There is nothing in truth-theoretic semantics, at least so far as using the truth theory as the vehicle of a compositional meaning theory goes, that prevents one from adopting a minimalist position on truth.'" Objections to minimalism must rest rather on establishing important connections between the concept of truth and other concepts. 
